from Daniel A. Bell: Beyond Liberal Democracy
(Description of Dworkin’s trip to China)
Those expressing “enthusiasm for liberal values,” Dworkin noted, did
voice their views: “all the scholars and almost all the students who spoke
about the issue on various occasions insisted that there was no impor
tant difference between Western values or conceptions of human rights
and their own.” One member of the audience “said of course the funda
mental situation of human beings is the same everywhere, that there
should be no more talk of distinctive Chinese values, that China must
begin what he called a ‘renaissance’ of liberal individualistic values.
When he finished, the large audience clapped loudly.” Nevertheless,
Dworkin found it peculiar that members of the audience did not seem to
share his desire to discuss specific cases of human rights violations, lead
ing him to conclude that Chinese academic discourse remains “eerily ab
stract in a country whose government treats itself as above the law.”
What Dworkin seems to have learned from his trip, in short, is that Chi
nese academics cannot mount a successful defense of an Asian philoso
phy even when given the opportunity to do so. The only question that
remains is how to implement liberal individualism in China, which ap
parently requires greater moral courage and concrete thinking on the
part of Chinese academics.
Not surprisingly, Dworkin’s visit generated less-than-friendly responses.
Professor Liufang Fang, who teaches law at the Chinese University of
Political Science and Law, opens his critique with a sarcastic account of
the college students who attended Dworkin’s lectures because they “did
not want to miss the festival-like event.” They could hardly hear any
thing, but “being squeezed in the crowd itself was a joy to many of the
students.” Professor Dworkin, meanwhile, “unilaterally believed that
his China tour was a valuable opportunity for China to be privy to his
ideas of liberty.” Ironically, he was taken for a ride by the Chinese gov
ernment. His visit had been organized to showcase China’s new free
doms, and the government knew full well that Chinese academics would
not argue publicly about the details of particularly sensitive cases.
Dworkin seemed unaware of the risks that China-based academics would
incur by publicly endorsing his condemnation of the Chinese govern
ment’s handling of such cases. As Professor Fang puts it, “the truth is
that the degree of freedom of speech is negatively correlated with the
risks borne by the speaker.” Moreover, Dworkin seemed unaware of the
extent to which “general discussions” of legal issues by China-based ac
ademics have led to substantial improvements of legal practice. Had
Dworkin been better informed, he would not have made facile comments
regarding the “eerily abstract” Chinese discourse. Professor Fang con
cludes his essay by suggesting that Chinese professors should spend
more time reading, thinking, and writing instead of wasting time on “hot
events.” Continue reading →
