Ranking of Chinese Law Schools by Scholarly Impact (Citations)

Ranking of Chinese Law Schools by Scholarly Impact (Citations)    

Beijing University Law School 1404     

Renmin University Law School  930     

Wuhan University Law School 900     

China University of Political Science and Law 827     

Zhongnan University of Economics and Law 618

 

From 中国人文社会科学学术影响力报告2000-2004, by 南京大学中国社会科学研究评价中心. See:

http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2007-10/19/content_6905868.htm

Modernizing Chinese villages or a robbery?

In the name of “socialist new village” movement, China’s provinces, such as Jiangsu, have been confiscating peasants’ houses and lands without giving them reasonable compensation since 2006. In these provinces, peasants were mandated to move to the concentrated residence, assigned a unit of the government-built apartment building, and given a pathetic amount of monthly stipend in exchange of their old houses, lands and traditional life style.

Many peasants refused to leave their homes. The local governments, in return, played all kinds of dirty tricks on them. Mr. Chou Lin, for example, experienced man-made black-outs, water supply cut off, and noisy fireworks outside of his window during night, because he rejected the government’s notice to move. Mrs. Jin, a 60 year-old lady from Nantong, was beaten up by the gangsters hired by a government-supported developer, and they broke her ribs.

For those who moved the “concentrated residence,” they were disappointed. Mrs. Zhao Meilan, a homeowner of a 200-square-meter house and a 0.4 acre land, was reallocated to a transitional apartment less than half the size of her old house. She was given a 25$ monthly stipend, which covered less than a fraction of her living expenses.

Here is more.

A Chinese blogger uploaded detailed descriptions and photos on some cases. Please see here.

China’s champions: Why state ownership is no longer proving a dead hand

From the FT, By Geoff Dyer and Richard McGregor
When the Aluminium Corporation of China acquired a 9 per cent stake in Rio Tinto last month, the Chinese state-owned company pulled off a number of firsts. Not only was it the biggest ever overseas investment by a Chinese group, it was also the largest ever dawn raid on the London stock market.

Yet while most of the attention focused on what the share purchase meant for BHP Billiton’s efforts to acquire Rio Tinto, the acquisition heralded another important trend – the quiet revolution under way in the Chinese state sector, which has produced a new generation of confident companies with global ambitions.

A decade ago, China’s state-owned sector looked like an economic disaster waiting to happen. In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, average profit margins in Chinese state companies fell to close to zero, and many reported huge losses. The government felt it had no option but to embark on a brutal programme of closures that left tens of millions without jobs.
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Life or death test for Chinese developers?

媒体近来风传未来100天是房地产企业的生死考验。传言的源头是一家房地产企业大亨,他认为“现在中国国内是从紧的货币政策,国际资本市场这条路又被堵死了,”而房地产企业一向靠“股市融资、圈地,再融资、再圈地……”这样左手圈钱、右手圈地的“把戏”赚钱,一旦资金不足,必定有公司倒闭。

今天传来华程房产顺利融资的消息,似乎表明了这个预测的失败。如果预测者不是有意误导大众的话(不排除其为达到商业目的而利用媒体炒作),那么他首先低估了全球化时代海外金融市场对中国经济的敏感度,其次高估了中国金融监管的力度,再次看错了监管者要达到的目标。 海外金融市场对中国市场的利润增长点有清晰的认识,既然为房产业目前是最赚钱的行业,为房产企业提供融资可以分享其利润,它当然不会错过机会。中国金融监管当下致力于收紧银根,但力度只及于国内银行,还不致完全掐断房产业的融资。监管者的目标是避免国内银行继续介入房产业导致房产泡沫,而不是强制目前的房产业洗牌。

当然,失败不表明预测者的不明就里。相反,只有精通行内规则、了解中国金融监管的明白人,才能做得出这样的判断。事实上,中国金融监管确实有能力让整个房产业重新洗牌。一旦收紧银根,恒大等房产企业巨幅扩张的脚步立即停顿,资金数日不畅就会立即罹于破产。而此前,由于国内银行对地产的贷款不限量,房产企业可以凭空造出巨大财富–国内可不止碧桂园一家走出了世界级的亿万富翁。

中国国家权力对财富分配的决定性影响,在房产业表露无遗。

附:有关华程房产

NYSE Euronext’s Alternext Welcomes Huacheng Real Estate
(08/04/08) Continue reading

Chinese government budget increases by 30%

from:韦森:中国经济忧思

一个更令人担心的问题,在于与国家基本制度结构所密切关联着的财税体制和近些年的政府财税政策。去年,中国GDP增长了10.6%,但政府财政收入却从 3.9万亿元增加到5.13万亿元,增幅达31.4%,近三倍于GDP的年增长速度。而且,这5.13万亿元财政收入还仅仅是我们称之为“第一财政”的政 府财政收入。如果把各地政府的收入——也就是所谓“第二财政”以及预算外收入、制度外收入算进来,肯定远大于这个数字。
最近,中央党校周天勇教授在《新京报》上发表的一篇文章估计,2007年中国各级政府全部财政收入实际高达9万亿元,占GDP总量的36%以上。另 外,2007年财政部还发行了两万多亿元国债。因此,在2008年24.66万亿元的GDP总量中,有11万多亿元控制在政府手中,占GDP总量的44% -45%。这些数字实际说明,在近些年中国市场化改革进程中,政府控制社会的力量正在急剧增强,在某些方面甚至比过去计划经济时期还强大。譬如,在“文 革”发生后的计划经济时代里,政府财政收入占GDP的比例大多都在三分之一以下。

Chinese board games are confusing

FT recently published a comment named Chinese board games are confusing. Of course it is not about board games. The board here refers to Chinese corporate board. The comment basically says that the two mandatory boards required by law in China–the board of directors and the supervisory board–overlap in function. The overlap then confuses investors and creates inefficiency.

Judicious as it is, the comment failed to mention the legal risks generated by this dual-board structure.

Please also see the report of FT

Good News for Law Students: Law Firms Hiring Attorneys with Expertise in China (2008)

[According to a report, this year’s market for law firm jobs should be good. Here is a piece of news from a webblog.]

“More and more corporations are expanding in China. Amid that growth, Executive search firm, A.E. Feldman, reports there is a growing need for U.S. legal services in China as more American companies seek business there. In fact, a number of law firms have already begun staffing up their offices in Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong. A.E. Feldman says attorney jobs are opening up at the Senior Associate and Partner level for candidates who are bilingual and have experience in Asia. Among the practice areas in greatest demand: securities, M&A, public and private offerings, private equity and intellectual property. Firms are willing to pay top dollar for candidates who meet these specific needs.”

from: http://blog.aefeldman.com/2008/04/02/law-firms-hiring-attorneys-with-expertise-in-china/

China: a New “Peaceful Transformation” agent for less democratic countries?

Recently China’s economic diplomacy has caused much criticism from the international community. While rich democratic countries emphasize human rights and environmental standards when they pursue their development agendas in Africa, the Middle East, etc., China is viewed to be taking a strategy that focuses primarily on trade, investment and infrastructure without any concern for human rights. Consequently, China’s bids earn favor, far exceeding those of the West. Seeing this happening, politicians from the US figure that China’s approach may be more appealing to the elite in less democratic countries, and they have launched a campaign of criticizing China’s economic diplomacy.

For readers who have some knowledge of American diplomatic policy, they should not be surprised by China’s economic diplomacy at all. It is actually very similar to the strategy that the Reagan administration took in the 1980s. Reagan, in the heyday of communism, believed that the communist countries would all be transformed to capitalism democracy if they were involved in world capitalist economic system. Reagan believed that despite the bad human right records, when the economies developed, their inclination towards democracy would grow, and ultimately lead to regime change. Reagan therefore promoted trade and developing aid in those countries–hence the famous “peaceful transformation” strategy was formed. Regan’s diplomacy succeeded. The year 1989 saw his predictions realized.

Now, if Regan had used a similar policy which seemed successful, why should China’s policy be criticized so much? Shouldn’t China be viewed as a new “peaceful transformation” agent? After all, if economic development would lead to democracy, does it matter whether the Western countries or China push for development?

Of course US politicians nowadays are not following this reasoning. They have rejected Regan’s strategy and rationale. “Peaceful transformation” seems too good to be true, particularly after seeing the non-democratic China’s rise in recent years. A typical challenge to Regan’s rationale is given by James Mann, former LA Times Beijing Bureau Chief and a distinguished China researcher.

In his recent book The China Fantasy, Mann challenges the conventional wisdom that has guided American policy toward China, which is with increasing prosperity and with the arrival of McDonald’s and Starbucks, China will move inevitably toward political liberalization and democracy. While this view is taken by many people, there is also a set of warnings flashing around, indicating that China is more fragile than it seems to the extent that it could collapse into chaos any time. The two drastically different understandings, however, only lead to the same consequence: in political speeches and in mass media, China is given less and less critical observation, and critics of China’s human rights abuses become less outspoken. The reason is simple—if it is the former, there is no point to make troubles for the US by criticizing Chinese government, given China will naturally be transformed to democracy; if it is the latter case, it will only hurt the US before the Communism actually collapse.

To Mann, this misleading strategy towards China has relieved outside pressure to China and helped it to grow without caring about human rights. The faults lie in the US and other Western courntries’ side. The American political elites—aided and abetted by big business, the media and think tanks—have misguided the public. Mann brings out an alternative understanding. What if there is a third alternative between the rise of democracy and the collapse of China’s political order? What would it mean for the United States—and, indeed, the world—if 20 or 30 years from now China becomes much richer and more powerful while still maintaining an authoritarian state and bad human right record? Mann thinks that scenario highly likely. The position of Mann’s towards China has influenced Washington DC politicians increasingly, whom now naturally care more about political reform and human rights in development–even to the extent that they set them as preconditions for any development aid. In other words, Regan’s “peaceful transformation” strategy has been abandoned.

Now that “peaceful transformation” strategy lost its market, politicians of course would not view China’s efforts as something inherently good. Their opinion is lowered when the US economic interests are in conflict with such efforts. Most obviously, when China set out to secure oil supply, the US politicians feel threatened, most of whom therefore change to an even more critical position.