A responsible troop drawdown in Iraq
May 13th, 2009 by MESH
From Raymond Tanter
A spike in violence against Iraqi civilians reinforces pressure on President Obama to maintain a force level that would allow for the maintenance of security during the drawdown.
President Obama announced a troop drawdown strategy from Iraq in February 2009, based on responsible removal of U.S. combat brigades. After removal of combat brigades, the U.S. mission is to change from combat to supporting the Government of Iraq (GOI) as it takes the lead in providing security. The United States, however, is to draw down from the approximately 142,000 troops in Iraq as of March 2009 and retain a transitional force of some 35,000-50,000 troops to train, equip, and advise Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), so long as they remain non-sectarian; conduct targeted counterterrorism missions; and protect American civilian and military operations within Iraq.
President Obama chose a 19-month phase-out over an option of 23 months or his campaign pledge of a 16-month drawdown, which he based on withdrawing one combat brigade per month when there were 16 U.S. combat brigades in Iraq.
In connection with the presidential goal of removal of U.S. combat brigades, field research in Iraq during October 2008 offers new insights, published in my 2009 book, President Obama and Iraq: Toward a Responsible Troop Drawdown. Interviews with Iraqis across the political spectrum reinforce the President’s decision to slow the pace of the drawdown, and suggest consideration of an even slower timetable. Political gains of the U.S. military surge and the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program, which took away about 100,000 Sunni Iraqi fighters from attacking coalition forces—a political surge—would be jeopardized with a 19-month drawdown.
Regarding reconsideration of withdrawal timetables, it is instructive to compare the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Quarterly Reports to gauge security progress. The April 2008 SIGIR report stated:
Progress on the security front this quarter was significant but uneven. No new provinces were transferred to Iraqi Security Forces control, but the overall level of violence was substantially lower as a result of the [U.S. military] surge.
Compare this 2008 assessment with the more negative April 2009 SIGIR report, in the aftermath of the transfer of security responsibilities to the ISF for the entire country:
Although average attack levels are at post-invasion lows, recent upticks in violence in Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninewa provinces exemplify the fragility of the current security situation. Notably, bombs in Baghdad and Diyala reportedly killed more than 75 people on April 23, 2009, marking the highest one-day civilian casualty total in more than a year. Some of the recent attacks arose from arrests by Iraqi (Shia) police of (Sunni) Sons of Iraq leadership. These violent eruptions underscore the need to ensure that SOI personnel are re-integrated into new positions within the Iraqi system, pursuant to the GOI’s agreement to do so.
President Obama stated in April 2009 that he has “a responsibility to make sure that as we bring troops out, that we do so in a careful enough way that we don’t see a complete collapse into violence.” But with the takeover of management of the American-sponsored SOI program by the GOI, it has not incorporated these Sunnis fighters into the ISF in the proportions anticipated. As of April 2009, only some 5,000 SOIs had been inducted into the ISF out of a planned 20,000 former fighters. And in late March, firefights broke out between SOI and ISF in Baghdad.
Indeed, American officers continue to be skeptical of the Government of Iraq’s potential to integrate Sunni Sons of Iraq. Failure to do so jeopardizes the ability of the ISF to maintain stability, and it may be necessary to slow the U.S. troop drawdown further until the ISF makes progress integrating the SOI.
One particular group of civilians the United States is obligated to protect is comprised of approximately 3,500 Iranian dissidents with “protected persons” status under the Fourth Geneva Convention. My interviews with SOI tribal chiefs in Iraq provide conclusive evidence that these Iranian dissidents in Iraq helped form and expand the SOI. Accordingly, the tribal chiefs stated that they perceive their own security to be linked to the safety of the Iranian dissidents in Iraq.
The American military has protected these approximately 3,500 Iranian dissidents, housed in a compound in Ashraf, Iraq, since they voluntarily relinquished their arms in exchange for such protection in 2004. And despite the Status of Forces Agreement of January 2009, the U.S. obligation to continue such protection remains so long as the American military is present and combat operations are ongoing, or at a minimum, to monitor ISF operations around Ashraf.
At issue is whether the pace of the American troop drawdown is consistent with the requirements of continued protection of the Iranian dissidents, especially in view of their ability to counter efforts of the Iranian regime to subvert Iraq. These dissidents have provided valuable intelligence regarding Iranian regime infiltration of Iraq and operate as a political counter to Tehran’s pressure on Baghdad. The dissidents have also acted as an interlocutor between Sunnis with influence over the insurgency on one hand, and the U.S. military on the other hand, helping to peel Sunnis away from the insurgency and encouraging their peaceful participation within the Iraqi political system.
Comments are limited to MESH members and invitees.
2 Responses to “A responsible troop drawdown in Iraq”
Posts+Comments
Posts+Comments
Posts+Comments
Posts+Comments
Ray Tanter provides a strong reminder to MESH readers that, despite the priority shift in U.S. policy from Iraq to Afghanistan, our troops are still engaged in a hostile and unpredictable environment and will be for some time. However, I believe that Ray’s point—that any drawdown over the next 19 months ought to be tied to the security situation—is too anemic. Our commitment to Iraq should be open-ended and conditions-based, and our policy should rise above the politics which created these timelines.
Ray correctly notes that the next 19 months will be critical as the combat brigades withdraw and are replaced by a transitional force of 30,000-50,000 forces to train, advise, protect and conduct counter-terrorism operations. However, we should not forget that the transitional force will only remain for another 12 months when, according to the Status of Forces Agreement, all U.S. troops will be withdrawn. This key point—the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011—should be renegotiated with the Iraqi authorities after the new government is seated in 2010. We need to remain in Iraq well beyond 2011 for a host of vital national interests—security, economic and diplomatic interests as a minimum—and any “responsible troop drawdown” should be adjusted accordingly. Anything other than that can hardly qualify as “responsible.”
Regarding his second point on the protection of the “Iranian dissidents,” otherwise known as the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK) or the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI), it would appear that their future is fixed. As someone who participated in the protracted Status of Forces Agreement negotiations, I would take issue with his point that the MEK enjoys “protected persons” status under Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and U.S. forces are required to “continue such protection… so long as the American military is present and combat operations are ongoing.” In fact, Article 27 only prevents extradition or forced repatriation to Iran as long as the United States maintains a presence in Iraq. Security for the protected persons can transfer to the sovereign Government of Iraq, as long as the proscription against extradition or forced repatriation is observed. And, if Ray’s advice on a responsible timeline is followed, there will be no U.S. forces in Iraq after 2011 to prevent their extradition or forced repatriation.
Hardly responsible.
Mark T. Kimmitt is a member of MESH.
Great points raised by Mark Kimmitt. As a participant in the change of U.S. strategy for Iraq in 2006, he is one of those responsible for improving the security situation in Iraq. After reading his post, I agree with him that the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011 should be renegotiated with Iraqi authorities after a new government takes office in 2010.
But Washington would be in a much better position in negotiations with a new government in Baghdad in 2011 if the United States helps prevent the Iranian regime from dominating the political process in Iraq. To the extent there can be an “Iran-free” Government of Iraq post-2010, it may be possible to have enough U.S. forces in Iraq to preserve the gains of the counterinsurgency strategy that General Kimmitt helped to design with Generals Petraeus and Odierno. Minimizing Iran’s influence in Iraq would also help achieve our security, economic, and diplomatic interests in Iraq.
A second point at issue concerns the status of the People’s Mojahedin of Iran (PMOI), the Iranian dissidents in Iraq. Mark’s participation in the Status of Forces Agreement negotiations gives him a bird’s eye view of the PMOI situation in Iraq.
With respect to the “Protected Persons” status of the PMOI under Article 27 of the Geneva Conventions, there are two sides to the story. On one side, Tehran and its allies in the Iraqi government claim that the organization has no status, and enjoys virtually no protection since responsibility for protection of the PMOI transferred from the United States to Iraq. They seek extradition, repatriation, and forced dislocation of the PMOI.
On the other side, there are those in the Government of Iraq who believe in observing international law and international humanitarian law. They hold that Article 27 of the Convention, as Mark stated, “prevents extradition or forced repatriation to Iran as long as the United States maintains a presence in Iraq.” Mark’s view is supported by many—and certainly not all—in the Iraqi government, and many more Iraqi politicians. In an interview on May 12, 2009 with the Al-Ittihad daily of Iraq, Iraqi Vice President, Dr. Tariq al-Hashimi, stated that “Iraq must guarantee security and safety of the PMOI individuals in the context of the Fourth Geneva Convention, because we are a civilized country committed to the International Law.”
Mark is correct that if my “advice on a responsible timeline is followed, there will be no U.S. forces in Iraq after 2011 to prevent… extradition or forced repatriation [of the PMOI from Iraq].” Hence, I modify my position and agree with Mark that “We need to remain in Iraq well beyond 2011 for a host of vital national interests—security, economic and diplomatic interests as a minimum—and any ‘responsible troop drawdown’ should be adjusted accordingly.”
Raymond Tanter is a member of MESH.