President Obama speaks to Iran
Mar 21st, 2009 by MESH
From Philip Carl Salzman
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President Obama used the occasion of Nowruz, the Persian New Year, to reach out to the Iranian people and the government of the Islamic Republic, promising a new start and relations based on mutual respect. The President stressed the commonalities between Americans and Iranians, who both spend their holidays by congregating with family and friends, exchanging gifts, and celebrating. The great historical achievements of Iran, including its literature, music, and painting, were acknowledged, as were the rich culture and high potential of Iran today. (If you cannot see the embedded clip of his remarks, click here.)
Notwithstanding President Obama’s misleading implication that previous American regimes had not extended a friendly hand to Iran, his brief speech—not broadcast on Iranian television—was gracious and I expect would be received favorably by the Iranian people. The President’s emphasis on the commonalities of Americans and Iranians reflects the major cultural frame of “progressive” American culture, a frame which emphasizes and celebrates “diversity” and “inclusion.” In this frame, Iranians and Americans should be able to get along just the way Iranian-Americans get along with Spanish-, Jewish-, African-, Italian-, and other hyphenated-Americans. We are all human, the President seems to say, and we all want the same things, which, if we work together, we can all gain. This is another assumption of the “progressive” American frame: all can be winners; there need be no losers; life is not a zero-sum game. And, if we are all winners, we can all be equal, a third element of the frame.
How will this message be received by the Iranians? Well, of course, there are Iranians and Iranians. Many have been and are positively disposed toward the United States. A public opinion poll done after President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech showed that a small majority of Iranians agreed with the characterization. (The pollster was quickly incarcerated.) Many Iranians would like better relations with America. But these Iranians are not the ones in charge. The government of the Islamic Republic is a self-perpetuating theocracy, supported by muscular control agencies, such as Revolutionary Guard. It decides policy, and the populace must conform or take the consequences, often deadly.
What is the cultural frame of the theocrats running the government of the Islamic Republic? For these mullahs, Shia Islam is the raison d’etre of their regime. They work for the greater glory of Shia Islam, for the conquest and subjugation of their mortal enemies, the Sunni Muslims, and the final triumph of Islam through the subjugation or eradication of non-Muslim infidels. These are ultimate goals, but in the shorter run the triumph of Shia forces in Lebanon and the annihilation of the Jews of Israel would be satisfying achievements. Shiism is the one true way, and “diversity” beyond Shia Islam is not celebrated. “Inclusion” is only possible within a hierarchy of Shia dominance. “Common humanity” does not apply to “sons of apes and pigs.” The Shia cultural frame of the Iranian theocrats and their civilian agents, such as Ahmadinejad, is highly particularistic, defining its values and strategy in terms of Shia Islam. Pleas based on “common humanity,” “diversity,” and “inclusion,” will be like drops of rain in the desert.
The people of Iran, on the other hand, would be more receptive to the President’s message. They know that many Iranians have settled happily in the United States and are doing well. Many Iranians are fed up with government by mullah and, given a chance, would chuck them out. Feeling against the mullahs is so strong in some segments that at least some people refuse to say the Islamic greetings of salaam alekum and khoda hafez, and have reverted to the ancient Persian greetings of darood and bedrood.
President Obama has come far, fast, with pretty words. But it seems highly unlikely that the rulers of Iran will be swayed, and almost certain that they will continue on their chosen path. What else, beyond words, does President Obama have in his quiver?
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In his broadcast message to Iran, President Obama expressed the desire for improved relations not just with the Iranian people, but also with the Iranian government. Philip Carl Salzman may well be right that the Iranian people are ready for improved Iranian-American relations, but that Iran’s authoritarian rulers are not. Not only does the Iranian leadership have an ambitious international agenda hostile to American interests, but it may also fear that an Iranian-American rapprochement would undercut their legitimacy and even their hold on power.
Yet even if Tehran rejects his offer of improved relations, President Obama was right to have made it. Here’s why:
To begin with, President Obama’s message was not just intended for Iran, but for the world at large. To those in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere who (rightly or wrongly) blamed the United States—especially the Bush administration—for the poor state of relations between Washington and Tehran, Obama has made clear that his administration is genuinely willing to improve relations. If Tehran does not respond in kind, the Obama administration at least stands to gain credit in important quarters just for trying. This could prove highly useful for the United States in rallying others to support increased sanctions or other actions against Tehran if it rejects Obama’s offer.
In addition, while the Iranian clerical leadership and the regime’s security forces fear that improved relations with the United States could undercut their rule, they also have other—perhaps more important—things to fear. The collapse in oil prices has seriously impacted Iran’s already weak economy, thus increasing the prospects for domestic unrest. The growing strength of the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan also increases the prospects that this virulently anti-Shi’a movement will support Tehran’s restive Sunni population. And while many see the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq as an opportunity for Iran to increase its influence in that country, the actual result may be to trap Iran in an endless proxy war with Arab states supporting the Sunni tribes and other anti-Iranian forces there. Finally, the prospect of increasing Kurdish-Arab conflict in Iraq as the United States leaves will confront Tehran with two unappetizing prospects: Turkish intervention in Iraq, and the spillover of conflict into Iran itself.
The economic and security problems that Tehran faces are, in fact, quite dire. While many Iranian leaders may be vain enough to think that Tehran can deal with these problems on its own, they are pragmatic enough to understand that there are no external powers other than the United States which would be both willing and able to help Iran do so. If they decide they cannot resolve their problems without external assistance (and this is a big “if”), they could realize that the United States is their most desirable partner. Obama’s friendly gesture could encourage them to arrive at this epiphany.
Salzman is right that the Iranian leadership has strong ideological motivations. Their assistance to Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as their hostility toward Israel, prove this. For these policies do nothing to solve Iran’s economic problems or the security threats it faces both internally and from neighboring countries. (The nuclear issue is more complicated; even Iranians hostile to the theocratic regime see Iran’s acquisition of atomic energy power as economically beneficial.)
But ideology is not the only motive for the Iranian leadership’s actions. It is also animated by some very pragmatic ones—the first and foremost of which is the survival instinct. And often in the past, ideologically-based regimes have found ways both to modify their ideologies, as well as find justifications for doing so, when their pragmatic interests require this.
Given the seriousness of the economic and security problems Iran faces, President Obama’s friendly gesture could be useful in helping the Iranian leadership realize that the United States is neither the only nor the most important threat they face, and that it could even be an ally against the latter. But will this work?
Tehran’s failure so far to release recently-arrested Iranian-American journalist, Roxana Saberi (who, by the way, has sought to portray the human dimension of Iran in her reporting), is not encouraging. Nor was Supreme Leader Khamenei’s negative reaction to the Obama broadcast. On the other hand, Khamenei did not completely rule out dialogue with the United States either. As he is never one to miss an opportunity to castigate the United States, this could be significant (but, of course, might not be).
Tehran is unlikely to accept Obama’s offer right away. But it might well do so as Tehran comes to realize that improved relations with the United States can help Iran deal with its many serious challenges—and that Tehran cannot do so effectively without the United States. It is the task of American diplomacy to deliver this message both firmly and persuasively.
Mark N. Katz is a member of MESH.