Middle East Strategy at Harvard

From Raymond Tanter

On April 30, the U.S. Department of State released the 2007 edition of Country Reports on Terrorism, which reports descriptions of State Sponsors of Terrorism and groups listed as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Country Reports rightly identifies the Iranian regime as the “most active state sponsor of terrorism,” which is consistent with evidence of terrorist capability and intent: The regime ships to Iraq “rockets, sniper rifles, automatic weapons, mortars that have killed thousands of Coalition and Iraqi Forces… and improvised explosive devices (IEDs)… specially designed to defeat armored vehicles.”

However, Country Reports is inconsistent in its application of principles of capability and intent in listing the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) as a foreign terrorist organization. By omitting the 2006 Country Reports allegation of capability and intent in the 2007 edition, State indicates a movement toward reconsideration of designation, which is due for mandatory review in October 2008.

Country Reports 2006 had alleged terrorist intent and capability: “MEK leadership and members across the world maintain the capacity and will to commit terrorist acts in Europe, the Middle East, the United State [sic], Canada, and beyond.” To its credit, State omits this allegation in Country Reports 2007; hence, there is no basis for designation of the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization: State relies on non-terrorist allegations to make its case.

On April 25, Patrick Clawson, deputy director of research at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, wrote that designation “should be based only on terrorism issues,” and that State “cited no alleged MEK terrorist activity since 2001, yet have increased allegations pertaining [to] the group’s non-terrorist activities.” Country Reports 2007 continues this trend of making allegations that are irrelevant to terrorist designation.

Tehran’s terrorism has been on the rise since 2003, despite the State Department’s conciliatory efforts toward Iran. The United States, unprovoked and at the request of Tehran, bombed the bases of the MEK in Iraq, disarmed the group, and limited its activities to its main encampment in Ashraf, Iraq. Washington hoped that by complying with Iran’s demands, Tehran would cease supporting the insurgency in Iraq. To the contrary, American conciliation only produced Iranian intransigence as Tehran escalated its shipment of roadside bombs to Iraq.

De-listing the MEK would be consistent with the legal criteria of the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Effective Death Penalty Act, because the allegations on which designation is based are false, misleading, or irrelevant. Additionally, de-listing would provide diplomatic leverage over Tehran, as the West is presently failing to constrain the Iranian regime’s nuclear program, sponsorship of terrorism, and subversion of Iraq.

Regarding the veracity of terrorist allegations against the MEK, a November 2007 decision by the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission (POAC), a UK Court, found that such claims were invalid:

There is no evidence that the [MEK] has at any time since 2003 sought to re-create any form of structure that was capable of carrying out or supporting terrorist acts. There is no evidence of any attempt to “prepare” for terrorism. There is no evidence of any encouragement to others to commit acts of terrorism… continued proscription could not be lawfully justified.

In light of the UK court ruling to delist the MEK in the UK and the absence of evidence for terrorist capability and intent in Country Reports 2007, Secretary of State Rice should de-list the MEK when the organization’s designation comes up for mandatory review in October 2008, if not immediately. To do otherwise would be inconsistent with the principle that designation should be dependent upon evidence of capability and intent.