Middle East Strategy at Harvard

From Philip Carl Salzman

“America’s current policies represent a fundamental departure from [America’s] centuries-old tradition,” concludes Michael B. Oren in a recent op-ed. In previous interventions in the Middle East, “American military action was seen as an ancillary to—rather than as a substitute for—diplomacy. And in no case did U.S. troops remain on Middle Eastern soil longer than their missions required.”

Oren cites Jefferson’s military invasion of the Barbary states in 1805, Theodore Roosevelt’s military intervention in Morocco in 1904, and Eisenhower’s military expedition to Lebanon in 1958 as precedents. “Many of America’s interests and objectives in the Middle East have remained consistent since Jefferson’s day, but the means to attaining them have changed.” As these means do not seem to have succeeded and have brought American into disrepute, Oren recommends that “Americans must return to the traditions established by their forebears,” specifically:

• “Use military might to defend basic interests but know when to cease fighting and negotiate.”
• “Support Israel but spare no effort to forge peace agreements between it and the Arab world.”
• “Most importantly, heed the advice proffered by George McClellan, the former Union general and Middle East traveler, in 1874: Americans must learn to ‘weigh (the Middle East) by (its) own rules.'”

But reflecting on some of the precedents Oren cites, it appears that, in his advice, he has forgotten another element in historically successful interventions: defeating the enemy. This worked for Jefferson and in other major U.S. military engagements, too well known to recite here. These precedents offer an “operational” criterion to apply to Oren’s advice that we “know when to cease fighting and negotiate.” It is this: cease fighting when you have defeated the enemy.

Oren’s similar advice to Israel is to jump to negotiation and press a “peace” agreement home. But if, following Oren’s precedents, defeat of enemies is the path to successful negotiation and agreement, how can a peace agreement be made prior to imposing a defeat on Israel’s enemies?

Finally, and “most importantly,” weigh the Middle East by its own rules—always good advice, and, if I may say so, an approach usually advocated by anthropologists, of which I’m one. What, then, are “Middle Eastern rules”? Cultural analysis (e.g. Charles Lindholm’s The Islamic Middle East) suggests that Middle Eastern rules come down to these:

• “People choose the strong horse over the weak horse” (as suggested by a prominent Middle Eastern informant).
• The goal is always to dominate your enemy and dominate the peace.
• Respect comes from strength and fortitude.

If these are the Middle Eastern rules, what will Middle Easterners think of governments and peoples who are not willing to fight to conquer, who want peace so much that they will sue for it and beg for it, and who will not back up their diplomacy with strength and fortitude?

Osama bin Laden, who told us about horses, has asserted that the West is too decadent to defend itself. Is our and our allies’ obsession with “disproportionate” strikes against enemies and our apparent reluctance to contemplate defeating them evidence that bin Laden is correct?