June 25th, 2015 by Joseph William Singer
The United States Supreme Court announced its decision in Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 2015 WL 2473449, — U.S. — (2015), upholding disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq. The case involved a challenge to criteria used by a state agency on where to give tax credits that subsidize construction of low-income housing. Plaintiff is a nonprofit organization that promotes housing for low-income families. It claimed that the agency’s formula steered housing to poorer areas and thus perpetuated or aggravated racial segregation in housing. The specific question taken by the Supreme Court was whether disparate impact claims are at all available under the Fair Housing Act. The Court decided that they are but limited them because of constitutional principles.
The Court noted that earlier cases had upheld disparate impact claims in employment discrimination when the statutes focused on consequences of actions rather than just motivation. Those statutes were Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The FHA makes it unlawful to “otherwise make unavailable” housing because of race or other characteristics. 42 U.S.C. §3604(a). That wording refers to consequences and thus supports a disparate impact approach. The mere fact that the statute makes actions illegal if they are undertaken “because of race” does not mean the statute requires a showing of intentional discrimination. Moreover, the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act (which added “handicap” as a protected class among other things) showed that Congress approved of the uniform case law that had interpreted the FHA to include a disparate impact claim. Justice Kennedy’s opinion refers to Congress’s explicit consideration of disparate impact claims by reference to legislative history and its rejection of a proposed amendment that would have eliminated disparate impact claims. Moreover, the 1988 Act included 3 exemptions from disparate impact claims that would have been superfluous had they not been available. For example, the 1988 amendments provided that “[n]othing in [the FHA] limits the applicability of any reasonable . . . restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. §3607(b)(1).
At the same time, the Court held that the Constitution prohibits enforcing a disparate impact claim based solely on statistical evidence of a disparity; rather, plaintiffs must show that defendant’s policy causes the disparity and that “there is an alternative practice that has less disparate impact and serves the [defendant’s] legitimate needs.” Because actors must be able to achieve legitimate government or private policies, such policies are not contrary to the disparate-impact requirement unless they are “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers” to equal access to housing. Mainly because of this limitation on the applicability of disparate impact claims, the Court remanded for consideration of whether the Texas policies met this standard.
Remedial orders must be limited to eliminating the offending practice and should be race-neutral where possible.
The Court’s recognition of disparate impact claims preserves their function in the context of zoning laws. In explaining the “discriminatory practices” the disparate impact claim was intended to eradicate, the Court explained: “These unlawful practices include zoning laws and other housing restrictions that function unfairly to exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods without any sufficient justification. Suits targeting such practices reside at the heartland of disparate-impact liability,” (citing the foundational case of Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F. 2d 926, 935–936 (2d Cir 1988), among other cases).
Importantly, the Court clarified that disparate impact claims are available against both private and governmental defendants, rejecting a theory that at least one Circuit had adopted in the past.
It appears that the recent regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development that define disparate impact claims are largely consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis but whether that is actually so may need to await further litigation. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11460 (2013), 24 C.F.R. §100.500.
Posted in Antidiscrimination law, Consumer protection, Fair Housing Act, Real estate transactions | Comments Off on Supreme Courts affirms disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act (with a caveat)
June 5th, 2015 by Joseph William Singer
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., regulates the processes by which debts are collected. The Third Circuit has agreed with other courts in holding that the filing of a foreclosure complaint can subject both the plaintiff bank and the lawyers filing the complaint to liability under the FDCPA. In the case of Kaymark v. Bank of America, N.A., 783 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2015), the allegation was that the complaint sought payments that were not yet due — a demand that violated the FDCPA. The Court applied the holding of the Supreme Court case of Heinz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995) that had established that lawyers are “engage[d] in consumer-debt-collection activity” when they file lawsuits.
Posted in Consumer protection, Mortgages, Real estate transactions | Comments Off on Foreclosure complaint can subject law firm & bank to a claim for violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)
June 5th, 2015 by Joseph William Singer
The Sixth Circuit has ruled that nonjudicial foreclosure satisfies constitutional due process requirements because the homeowner/borrower was given notice of the foreclosure and notice of who to cure the default or seek a loan modification and how to redeem the property (get it back) after the foreclosure sale during a six-month redemption period. Garcia v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 782 F.3d 736 (6th Cir. 2015). These statutory procedures satisfied the constitutional right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of a property right.
Posted in Consumer protection, Due process, Mortgages, Real estate transactions, Title issues | Comments Off on Postforeclosure judicial process satisfies due process clause
December 10th, 2014 by Joseph William Singer
While the US Constitution’s free speech provisions in the first amendment apply only to state action, both California and New Jersey have interpreted their state constitutions to grant individuals free speech rights in some cases in relation to private parties. In both states, citizens have the right to distribute leaflets in shopping centers. In Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Avenue Owners, Inc., 2014 WL 6777311 (N.J. 2014), a resident wanted to run for a seat on the Board of Directors of the coop and sought to distribute materials relevant to his campaign and he was prevented from doing so by the coop board. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the coop rule banning soliciting and distributing written materials in the building was unreasonable and a violation of the resident’s state constitutional free speech rights. The ruling reaffirmed and expanded on the rulings in earlier cases that protected free speech rights of owners in common-interest communities when those owners wanted to post signs. See Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 46 A.3d 507 (N.J. 2012); Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners Ass’n, 929 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 2007).
Posted in Condominiums, Consumer protection, Free speech, Trespass | Comments Off on New Jersey Supreme Court confirms state constitution’s grant of free speech rights to enable a coop owner to disseminate written information to co-owners
July 10th, 2014 by Joseph William Singer
The Ninth Circuit held that a mortgage servicer that allegedly engaged in robo-signing may well have violated an Arizona statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-420, that criminalizes filing false property title documents with the state recording offices. In re Mortg. Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc (Robinson v. Am. Home Mortg. Serv. Inc.), 2014 WL 2611314, 2 014 U.S. App. LEXIS 10934 (9th Cir. 2014). There was evidence that trustee’s sale documents were notarized in blank and signed later by a person other than the one who was supposed to sign the document. Such signings were also done in bulk (robo-signing) and because not signed by the correct person were forged. In addition, notaries are supposed to witness the signature not notarize a blank document before any signature appears. The case is notable because the servicer was MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.). Judge William Fletcher engaged in a detailed discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of the MERS system.
Posted in Consumer protection, Mortgages, Real estate transactions, Statute of frauds, Title issues | Comments Off on Robo-signing mortgage servicer may have violated state false document statute
June 21st, 2014 by Joseph William Singer
The Seventh Circuit found no deceptive conduct within the meaning of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (ICFA) when a condo developer substantially changed the governing documents after the condo sales. Goldberg v. 401 North Wabash Venture LLC, 2014 WL 2579939 (7th Cir. 2014). The case concerned Trump Tower in Chicago which contains hundreds of residential condominium units and hundreds of hotel condominium units as well as substantial retail space and other facilities. The purchase agreement gave TrumpOrg the “right, in its sole and absolute discretion, to modify the Condominium Documents.” Writing for the three-judge panel and applying Illinois law, Judge Posner held that this clause was sufficient to immunize TrumpOrg from any claim of deceptive conduct. Thus the hotel condo owners had no rights when TrumpOrg “greatly curtailed the owners’ rights in the hotel facilities.” Nor did the conduct violate the statute governing condominiums.
Posted in Condominiums, Consumer protection, Real estate transactions, Servitudes | Comments Off on Contractual power to modify condo declaration held to be complete defense to claim of deceptive conduct under state consumer protection law
January 13th, 2014 by Joseph William Singer
The Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has ruled that owners may make affirmative defenses to eviction claims by banks that acquired title to their property through a private or nonjudicial foreclosure. Bank of America v. Rosa, 466 Mass. 613 (2013). Those defenses may challenge the way in which the bank acquired title to the property through the foreclosure process and and power of the bank to foreclose in the first place. They may also include any equitable defenses that would defeat the claim for a right to possession of the property (the right to evict).
Posted in Consumer protection, Mortgages, Real estate transactions, Title issues | Comments Off on Owners who lost title to their homes through nonjudicial foreclosure are entitled to raise defenses to eviction
December 8th, 2013 by Joseph William Singer
A number of recent cases has revealed the persistence of racial discrimination affecting municipal decisions about housing. The Sixth Circuit found, for example, in Hidden Village, LLC v. City of Lakewood, Ohio, 734 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2013), that town officials may have engaged in a campaign of harassment designed to induce African American residents to move out of town. The case involved a Lutheran religious organization that helped young people released from foster care or juvenile detention to enter society. The organization found a helpful landlord willing to rent apartments to the organization’s clients. At first the town officials argued that this amounted to an institutional use in violation of the zoning law but the town planning commission found otherwise. At that point, the complaint alleges that town officials began a campaign of police harassment that involved citations for minor offenses and unreasonable searches of apartments.
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the landlord had standing to sue to claim violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§1981-1982 and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq. The court also held that plaintiffs had presented a viable substantive due process claim. The court noted that the due process clause “protects landlords against irrational restrictions on how they use their property. Rationality may be a low bar. But the government flunks even that test when it tries to prevent a landlord of any race from renting to tenants based on their race.
The court also found a potential violation of §3617 of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3617 which makes it illegal “to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or protected [by the Fair Housing Act].” Although federal courts have been confused on the issue, the Sixth Circuit held that a §3617 violation could be shown even if there was no underlying violation of another section of the Fair Housing Act. In this case, for example, no one denied the youths housing or granted them discriminatory terms. Nonetheless, the facts sufficiently alleged that the town sought to interfere with their enjoyment of the right to obtain housing without regard to race.
In a second case, the Eastern District of New York held that a city violated the Fair Housing Act when it rezoned several parcels to prevent the building of low- and middle-income housing. The court found that the facts supported a finding of liability under both a discriminatory treatment and disparate impact theory. MHANY Mgmt Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Garden City, 2013 WL 6334107 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). read article The court found a discriminatory treatment claim (intentional racial discrimination) because there was sufficient evidence to conclude that animus because of race was a significant factor in the denial of the housing opportunity. Evidence to that effect was shown by the fact that exclusion of low-income housing would impose a greater impact on African Americans than on whites, there was a history of racial bias in the city, and the sequence of events leading up to the denial of the housing opportunity that suggested a racially discriminatory motive. Although the city gave legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the change in the zoning law, the plaintiffs undermined those justifications by showing that the proposed development would not significantly affect traffic and that other reasons given by the city were not supported by the available evidence. The court thus found that the proffered justifications were pretextual.
The court also found a disparate impact claim. Although the city gave legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision (reducing traffic and providing for townhouse construction), it did not show that these goals could not be achieved in a less discriminatory manner or in a manner that did not perpetuate racial segregation.
Posted in Antidiscrimination law, Consumer protection, Due process, Fair Housing Act, Leaseholds, Real estate transactions | Comments Off on Housing discrimination by town officials still a problem
November 21st, 2013 by Joseph William Singer
The Supreme Court has twice in recent years accepted certiorari in cases to decide whether disparate impact claims are available under the Fair Housing Act. Both cases settled before the Supreme Court could determine the issue. The most recent was Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011). The prior case was Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010). Another lawsuit is in process called Am. Ins. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (D.D.C., filed 06.26.13), brought by the insurance industry to challenge the disparate impact regulations promulgated this year by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). read article Those regulations define when disparate impact claims are available and are consistent with the general outlines of the doctrine as it been developed by all the Circuit courts. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a)–(b).
Posted in Antidiscrimination law, Consumer protection, Fair Housing Act | Comments Off on Settlement of Mount Holly case prevents Supreme Court from addressing disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act
November 13th, 2013 by Joseph William Singer
In Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, 2013 WL 5859575 (11th Cir. 2013), the Eleventh Circuit ruled that testers have standing to bring suits claiming violation of the public accommodation provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The mere fact that one enters property for the purpose of testing compliance with the ADA rather than to purchase products does not deprive the plaintiff of standing to sue for violation of the law. In an odd coda, however, the court noted that injunctive relief was only appropriate if the plaintiff could show injury from the store’s failure to comply with access requirements. The fact that he claimed he would return to the store in the future and that it was located 30 miles from his house was sufficient to show “injury in fact” and give him standing to seek injunctive relief.
Posted in Antidiscrimination law, Consumer protection | Comments Off on Testers have standing to sue for violations of the public accommodation provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act
November 8th, 2013 by Joseph William Singer
The Sixth Circuit has held that §3617 of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq., prohibits conduct intended to encourage residents to move even if they are not denied housing or induced to move. Hidden Village, LLC v. City of Lakewood, 2013 WL 5811642 (6th Cir. 2013). The basic provisions of the FHA (embodied in §3604) prohibit denying housing for discriminatory reasons, providing unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions for housing, and expressing an invidious preference for buyers or renters of a particular race, sex, etc. Section 3617 prohibits coercion, intimidation, threats, or any interference with any person’s right to exercise the fair housing rights protected by 3604. Federal courts have been confused and divided over whether §3617 provides a remedy when there is no underlying §3604 violation.
In Hidden Village, municipal officials were unhappy with a religious youth service that helps young people released from foster care or juvenile detention enter society. It planned to house its clients in apartments leased from a private landlord. Following a zoning controversy over whether the use was a lawful “residential” use or a prohibited “institutional” use, municipal officials engaged in a campaign to make life difficult for the charity’s beneficiaries by issuing numerous citations for minor offenses and conducting a warrantless search of the housing premises.
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that there had been uncertainty about the meaning of §3617 but held that it prohibits conduct intended to interfere with someone’s ability to obtain or enjoy housing whether or not there is an independent violation of one of the terms of §3604. The Court explained:
“[D]efendants argue that they may not be charged with violating § 3617 unless they separately violated at least one of the provisions in §§ 3603–3606. We disagree. Section 3617 nowhere says that it comes into play only when a violation of one of these other sections has also occurred. An example confirms the freestanding nature of some § 3617 claims. Suppose Alice says to Bob, a prospective home buyer, “If a seller ever discriminates against you because of your race, sue him!” Eve, a racist eavesdropper, becomes enraged upon hearing this conversation and threatens to assault Alice. At this point, Eve has violated § 3617, regardless of whether she discriminated against Bob or otherwise violated the fair housing rights secured by §§ 3603–3606. Eve has “threaten[ed] … [a] person,” namely Alice. And this threat was “on account of [Alice’s] having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of [a fair housing right].” Eve threatened Alice because Alice had encouraged Bob to protect himself against discrimination relating to housing. The statute requires no more.”
Posted in Antidiscrimination law, Consumer protection, Fair Housing Act | Comments Off on Municipal attempt to induce residents to move because of race violates Fair Housing Act even if they do not move
October 29th, 2013 by Joseph William Singer
The Ninth Circuit has upheld a city administrative program that regulated landlords whose buildings violated the housing code by allowing tenants to pay a reduced rent into a publicly administered escrow fund which is paid to the landlord once the violations are corrected. Sylvia Landfield Trust v. City of Los Angeles, 2013 WL 4779664 (9th Cir. 2013). Four landlords challenged the program as a violation of their substantive rights under the due process clause. The court upheld the program because it was rationally related to the legitimate government goal of enforcing the housing code to protect tenants from unsafe conditions.The landlords had claimed that the tenants caused the problems, that their properties were not sufficiently substandard to warrant application of the law, and that the program was intended to enrich the government. The court rejected all these claims, noting that the law allowed landlords to prove that tenants were responsible for the conditions and that the program was designed to promote compliance with safety regulations, not to generate income for the government. The program therefore did not arbitrarily deprive the landlords of their liberty or property; nor was it taken ‘with deliberate indifference toward…constitutional rights.”
Posted in Consumer protection, Due process, Leaseholds | Comments Off on Rent escrow law held constitutional
September 18th, 2013 by Joseph William Singer
The Ninth Circuit upheld Los Angeles’s Rent Escrow Account Program that enables tenants to pay rent to a public account rather than to the landlord if the landlord fails to repair habitability violations. Sylvia Landfield Trust v. Los Angeles, 2013 WL 4779664 (9th Cir. 2013). The court found that the program served the legitimate government goal of ensuring compliance with regulations ensuring safe and habitable housing for tenants and that the program had adequate procedural safeguards to ensure it was not applied arbitrarily.
Posted in Consumer protection, Leaseholds | Comments Off on Los Angeles rent escrow program upheld under constitutional challenge
August 22nd, 2013 by Joseph William Singer
The Supreme Court of New Mexico has held that the state public accommodations law applies to a photography business that offers its services to the public. Because that law prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, the business could not lawfully refuse to take pictures at a same-sex commitment ceremony because of the owner’s religious beliefs. Elane Photography v Willock, — P.3d — (N.M. 2013). The state public accommodations law does not violate the owner’s free speech rights since professions involving creativity or expression are not exempt from those laws. The court explained that “Elane Photography believes that because it is a photography business, it cannot be subject to public accommodation laws. The reality is that because it is a public accommodation, its provision of services can be regulated, even though those services include artistic and creative work. Nor did the owner’s religious beliefs offer a reason to engage in discriminatory conduct. “Under established law, the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes),” the court explained, citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) .
Posted in Antidiscrimination law, Consumer protection, Religious freedom | Comments Off on Photography business cannot discriminate against same-sex couples
July 7th, 2013 by Joseph William Singer
South Carolina joins the growing list of jurisdictions that bans transfer fee covenants. 2012 S.C. Acts 106, codified at S.C. Code §27-1-70.
Posted in Consumer protection, Real estate transactions, Restraints on alienation, Servitudes | Comments Off on South Carolina prohibits transfer fee covenants
July 7th, 2013 by Joseph William Singer
California passed a statute on Jan. 1, 2013 called the California Homeowner Bill of Rights (Assembly Bill 278, ch. 86, adopted July 11, 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). Among other things, it prohibits banks from proceeding with foreclosures if the homeowners is seeking a loan modification and it requires the bank to act on qualified applications for loan modifications. Cal. Civ. §2923.5.It also subjects banks to a penalty for recording unverified documents. Cal. Civ. §2924.17. It also prevents eviction of tenants who have fixed-term leases as long as those leases last even if the landlord loses the property to foreclosure before the end of the lease term and even if the lease was created after the mortgage. Cal. Civ. Proc. §1161b(b).
Posted in Consumer protection, Leaseholds, Mortgages, Real estate transactions | Comments Off on California Homeowner Bill of Rights regulate foreclosures
July 7th, 2013 by Joseph William Singer
A Pennsylvania trial court held that a seller had no duty to reveal that a murder/suicide took place in the house. Milliken v. Jacono, 60 A.3d 133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013). The court interpreted a state statute that required sellers to reveal “material defects” and found that events that had happened in the house were not a “material defect” in the physical structure of the property. The court declined to find any common law duty to reveal the information on the ground “an expansion of required seller disclosures from the physical to the psychological is a massive expansion in the character of disclosure. It requires the seller to warn not only of the physically quantifiable but also of utterly subjective defects.” Id. at 140. A dissenting opinion would have found such an obligation because “[r]eputation and history can have a significant effect on the value of realty.” Id. at 145 (Bender, J., dissenting).
Posted in Consumer protection, Real estate transactions | Comments Off on Court holds that a seller has no duty to reveal that a murder/suicide took place in the house
July 7th, 2013 by Joseph William Singer
In Glazer v. Chase Home Finance, 704 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2013), the Six Circuit found lawyers who initiated a foreclosure may be “debt collectors” subject to the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§1692 to 1692p, if they regularly perform this function, and thus may be liable for making “false, deceptive or misleading representations” in connection with the foreclosure.
Posted in Consumer protection, Mortgages, Real estate transactions | Comments Off on Lawyers held to be “debt collectors” that can be held liable for false statements in connection with a foreclosure
March 3rd, 2013 by Joseph William Singer
State courts have disagreed about whether MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems) has standing to foreclose on property or to assign whatever interest it has in the mortgage to the bank that holds the mortgage currently so that that bank can bring foreclosure proceedings. Some courts have held that MERS has no property interest in the mortgage but is a mere agent for the mortgage owner so it cannot bring foreclosure proceedings itself or assign the mortgage to anyone else. Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group, Inc., 285 P.3d 34, 36–37 (Wash. 2012) (because MERS does not hold the note, it can neither initiate nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings not assign an interest in the note to a trustee who can do so). But others have held that MERS may initiate foreclosure proceedings in its own name and/or assign the mortgage to someone else. Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 819, 826–827 (2011) (MERS may initiate nonjudicial foreclosure under deed of trust); Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Revoredo, 955 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (MERS may foreclose as agent of the note holder); Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Saurman, 805 N.W.2d 183 (Mich. 2011) (MERS had sufficient “interest in the debt” to initiate nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings); Jackson v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 494–495, 501 (Minn. 2009)(applying Minn. Stat. §507.413 allowing MERS to initiate foreclosure proceedings).
In Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., — F.3d —, 2013 WL 563374 (1st Cir. 2013), the First Circuit, applying Massachusetts law, has now held that MERS may assign mortgages because it does own a legal interest in the mortgage. In an opinion by Judge Selya, the court held that MERS has the “legal interest” in the mortgage because it is named as the mortgagee but that the bank that actually issued the note and has the right to enforce the mortgage to secure the loan has the “beneficial interest” in the mortgage. The court reasoned that the party that owns the note or is entitled to enforce it (not necessarily the same party) has the equitable right to the protection of the mortgage giving it a right to foreclose and that MERS is merely holding title to the mortgage for the benefit of that party. At the same time, MERS has a sufficient interest to hold the mortgage title for the benefit of the owner of the “beneficial interest” in the mortgage. It is not clear if that would mean that MERS could bring foreclosure proceedings in its own name or that means that the right to foreclose cannot be separated from rights in the note.
Posted in Consumer protection, Mortgages, Real estate transactions, Title issues | Comments Off on First Circuit allows MERS to assign mortgages to the mortgage holder
November 3rd, 2012 by Joseph William Singer
In Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 2012 Ohio 5017, 2012 Ohio LEXIS 2628 (Ohio 2012), the Supreme Court of Ohio joined other courts that have refused to allow banks to foreclose if they cannot prove by written evidence at the time of foreclosure that they have a legal right to foreclose. In this case, Federal Home Loan commenced a foreclosure action before it obtained an assignment of the promissory note and mortgage securing the loan, although it attempted to “cure” that defect by obtaining the assignment later. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed lower court rulings that had decided that the cure would allow the foreclosure to proceed; instead, it held that state law required lawful standing at the time the foreclosure action was brought. It cited cases from other states that denied standing to MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems) because it did not possess any interest in the note or the mortgage. The court dismissed the foreclosure claim without prejudice, so the lender can refile now that it has obtained a written assignment of the mortgage and lawful possession of the note. The court’s ruling suggests, however, that a bank that cannot provide proof that it “owns” the rights in mortgage and/or the note may not be able to foreclose, leaving to another day the question of whether the lender can use alternate evidence to prove its property rights and how a borrower/homeowner can clear title to the property that appears to still be encumbered by a mortgage.
Posted in Consumer protection, Mortgages, Real estate transactions, Title issues | Comments Off on Foreclosure denied when the lender obtained assignment of the note and mortgage after filing the foreclosure action
October 7th, 2012 by Joseph William Singer
The New York Court of Appeals has held that a loft owner who has not complied with regulations designed to ensure that lofts are habitable cannot collect rent or evict the residential tenant from her home. Chazon v. Maugenest, 971 N.E.2d 852 (N.Y. 2012). In one sense this is a straight-forward application of modern landlord/tenant law. The case is unusual because the tenant has been living in the loft without paying rent for nine years and because the tenant’s initial occupation was illegal since the property had been formerly used for commercial purposes and rented to a residential tenant in violation of New York City ordinances. The Court felt it had no discretion given the clear language of the loft law. That law had been intended to induce loft landlords to upgrade the property to make it habitable but hundreds of such landlords have still not complied with it despite the fact that it has been in effect for 30 years. The court held that the clear language of the loft law would apply even if the landlord’s violations were procedural rather than substantive.
Posted in Consumer protection, Leaseholds | Comments Off on Loft landlord denied right to evict until housing is brought up to code
August 20th, 2012 by Joseph William Singer
In Washington state, lenders typically use the deed of trust form for mortgages where the lender is the “beneficiary” of the trust and the “trustee” has the power to act to protect the beneficiary’s interest by foreclosing on the property if the borrower defaults on the note (the underlying loan). MERS is typically listed as the beneficiary of the deed of trust rather than the lender that actually issued the loan (and signed the note) in order to avoid having to record future assignments of the mortgage; the deed of trust is recorded listing MERS as the beneficiary rather than the lender that issued the note to the borrower/homeowner. Interpreting the meaning of the word “beneficiary” in state foreclosure statutes, the Washington Supreme Court agreed with other courts that have held that MERS is not actually the beneficiary of the note and thus has no power to initiate a nonjudicial foreclosure of the property upon default of the payments. Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group, Inc., 2012 WL 3517326 (Wash. 2012).
The court refused to say what the consequences of this ruling would be, although it did suggest that the proper party to bring the foreclosure is the current holder of the note who actually possesses the note or can demonstrate the chain of transactions that makes it the beneficiary of the note. The court also suggested that MERS might act as an agent of the actual beneficiary but only if it could identify the principal and prove that it had been granted agency power to act on behalf of that principal.
The court also held that the facts might present a violation of the state consumer protection act because MERS misrepresented itself as the beneficiary to the borrower, thus engaging in a deceptive business practice. Whether the statute was violated depended on whether the borrower could show that she was injured by the deceptive statement. This is a potentially explosive ruling because MERS’s entire business model depends on listing it, rather than the lender, as the “mortgagee” or “beneficiary” of the deed of trust. On the other hand, the court finds no consumer protection violation unless the borrower can show injury and MERS could avoid causing injury by keeping track of who holds the note and revealing that information to the borrower. This would represent a significant change in MERS’s original business model since it typically only would reveal to borrowers the identity of the loan servicer, not the current holder of the note and not the chain of assignments from the original lender.
Posted in Consumer protection, Mortgages, Real estate transactions | Comments Off on Washington Supreme Court holds MERS cannot initiate private deed of trust foreclosures
June 26th, 2012 by Joseph William Singer
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held in Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, — A.3d —, 2012 WL 2120868 (N.J. 2012), that the free speech clause of the state constitution guarantees the right to post political signs on one’s property and that any covenants or rules of a homeowners association to the contrary are unenforceable. The owner in this case posted a sign inside the window of his townhouse and a second sign inside his door. Those signs supported his own candidacy for town council. The Association’s rules banned all signs other than “for sale signs.” The court distinguished its earlier ruling in Committee for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 929 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 2007), which upheld minor restrictions on sign placement by property owners who were members of the association and did not involve an election to a state or local public office as was the the case in Mazdabrook. Conversely, because the sign was on Khan’s own property, and not common property managed by the association, his interests were stronger. The ruling was premised on prior cases interpreting New Jersey’s free speech clause to apply to private actors on private property in at least some instances, a ruling at odds with the First Amendment which only applies to the federal government or “state actors” through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Posted in Consumer protection, Real estate transactions, Servitudes | Comments Off on Homeowners’ Association sign regulations violate free speech rights under state constitution
June 23rd, 2012 by Joseph William Singer
In Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n (Fannie Mae), 2012 Mass. LEXIS 488 (Mass. June 22, 2012), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a foreclosing party must be in physical possession of both the note and the mortgage (or be acting on behalf of someone who does) when bringing a foreclosure proceeding. However, the ruling applies only prospectively to foreclosures that occur in the future, with the exception that the plaintiff in Eaton that convinced the Court to clarify this rule can take the benefit of it. The refusal to apply the rule retroactively was based on the belief that the law may have been unclear beforehand and that it was the case that many people acted without regard for this principle in the past.
Posted in Consumer protection, Due process, Mortgages, Real estate transactions, Title issues | Comments Off on Mass high court prospectively requires banks to physically possess the note as well as the mortgage in order to foreclose
June 23rd, 2012 by Joseph William Singer
A federal judge in Massachusetts ruled that websites are “places of public accommodation” regulated by the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §12182(a)), and thus the online movie service Netflix was required to provide closed captioning for all it “Watch Instantly” content. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84518 (D. Mass. June 19, 2012). The court’s judgment rested on the First Circuit’s conclusion that “places of public accommodation” under the ADA were not limited to “actual physical structures.” Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994).
Posted in Antidiscrimination law, Consumer protection | Comments Off on Websites are public accommodations so Netflix must provide close captioning on web-streamed movies
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