{"id":8,"date":"2005-03-26T19:46:00","date_gmt":"2005-03-26T23:46:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.law.harvard.edu\/zeroday\/2005\/03\/26\/trusting-computers\/"},"modified":"2005-03-26T19:46:00","modified_gmt":"2005-03-26T23:46:00","slug":"trusting-computers","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/zeroday\/2005\/03\/26\/trusting-computers\/","title":{"rendered":"Trusting computers"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/a><\/p>\n

Computers have supplanted all other forms of media to safe guard our
\ninformation.  Computers store everything from banking histories to
\nrecipes.  Combined with the connectedness of the Internet all of this
\ninformation is leveraged to guide our decisions and purchase our needs
\nand wants.  This is just the surface of how deep computing affects our
\ndaily lives however.  Computers control ballast systems that keep
\ntankers afloat and SCADA systems that regulate the flow of rivers
\nthrough dams.  Computers are the most pervasive element of how our
\nsociety controls the environment that we live in.  
\n
\nTo state that trust is important is to understate the obvious.
\n Trust is a luxury however, and one that we can not afford.  Our
\nsystems are still fragile and susceptible to human malice and poor
\nprogramming.  Virii by the millions have emerged into the world of
\ncomputing.  They infect computers by the interactions of others.  This
\nvector of infection is personified by email users who open foreign
\nattachments.  Even more deadly is the worm, which can infect without
\nthe interaction of a user.  Worm infection is steadily rising with each
\npassing year.  Code Red alone compromised 250,000 computers in nine
\nhours.  Control and trust is lost when these infections occur.  
\n
\nWe absolutely need to trust the machines that help run the fabric
\nof society.  As a society we must constantly add fail-over systems,
\nmonitors and vaccines to computers.  Until this type of trust is gained
\nsystems must be open to the user.  The more transparent the computers
\nare the more easily a rouge program can be detected.  The quicker the
\ndevelopment process the faster important patches and medicines can be
\ndispatched to infected machines.  
\n
\nOne of the latest contenders is the “Trusted Computing” platform.
\n In this regime manufacturers provide equipment which will certify that
\neach application before it is allowed to execute.  The cost of this
\ntype of regime is that development is retarded due to a rigorous
\ncertification process.  Even patches will have to undergo certification
\nand create an even bigger gap between infections and inoculation.  The
\nbenefits are paltry in comparison to this cost.  Certain virii will be
\nprevented from executing.  Namely those that are sent via email to
\nunsuspecting users.  However worms would not be deterred since they
\ngenerally infect programs that are already running.  These programs
\nwould already certified but contain vulnerabilities, or flaws in the
\ncode, which allow remotely launched programs to exploit them.  The
\ncertification process does not guarantee that the code works well, or
\nthat it even works at all.  It just stipulates that it is from a
\ncertain developer or company.  
\n
\nA switch to this “Trusted Computing” environment would not solve
\nthe trust issue.  Software and hardware manufacturers are still not
\nliable for any damages incurred.  Society must stay vigilant in regards
\nto what computers do and monitor them.  The stakes are far too high to
\ntrust our computers just yet.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Computers have supplanted all other forms of media to safe guard our information.  Computers store everything from banking histories to recipes.  Combined with the connectedness of the Internet all of this information is leveraged to guide our decisions and purchase our needs and wants.  This is just the surface of how deep computing affects our […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":214,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/zeroday\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/zeroday\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/zeroday\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/zeroday\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/214"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/zeroday\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/zeroday\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/zeroday\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/zeroday\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/zeroday\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}