http:\/\/excesscopyright.blogspot.com\/2009\/08\/my-response-to-prof-charles-nesson-re.html<\/a><\/p>\nBest,<\/p>\n
Howard<\/p>\n
***
\nDear Charlie:<\/p>\n
First of all, given the facts as they have come out both before and as reported in the various media during the trial (I obviously haven\u2019t seen the transcript), I still tend to doubt that this was a particularly winnable case.<\/p>\n
so stop right there. you mean winnable at trial.<\/em><\/p>\nBTW, in 2004 we \u201cwon\u201d this battle in Canada before it ever really started by preventing the disclosure of the names behind IP addresses in the Canadian version of the RIAA\u2019s attempt to sue individuals. And we have a similar statutory minimum damages regime here, inspired by the USA but with some differences such as a max of CDN $20,000 per work. Still quite dangerous. The Canadian record companies were unable or unwilling to provide sufficient admissible evidence to warrant this disclosure in light of the \u201crisk that the information as to identity may be inaccurate\u201d, the resulting exposure to serious civil liability and the invasion of privacy. We were helped by a pretty good federal privacy statute in Canada and at least two ISPs that seriously stood up for their customers at the time (Shaw and Telus). See here and here. I was involved on the winning side. It\u2019s really too bad that these cases weren\u2019t likewise stopped at the outset in the USA, but that battle appears to have been lost a long time ago in other cases.<\/p>\n
and never fought, a tragedy in leadership for harvard to stand idly by, unwilling to put its weight behind motion to stop their subpoenas<\/em><\/p>\nThere’s really not much I can add to my original blog post from August 3, following the July 31 verdict and my other posts on this.<\/p>\n
I can point to Ray Beckerman’s \u201cwish list\u201d, which outlines several possible technical and practical arguments based upon such matters as dates of registration, lack of proof of actual \u201cdistribution\u201d according to the language of and case law on \u00a7 106(3), etc. which might or might not have worked to get Joel off the hook. Ray also mentions our Canadian case in his point that \u201cPlaintiffs should be required to prove that the downloaded song file copies were played and listened to, and their contents verified, by a person qualified to make such determination. See Deposition of President of MediaSentry in BMG v. Doe.\u201d<\/p>\n
all respect to ray, these defenses do not join the fundamental issues. this trial was not an exercise in getting joel off the hook.<\/em><\/p>\nI don’t know which of these issues were addressed at trial or how much evidence on these issues there is on the record.<\/p>\n
Apart from a victory based on issues such as those on Ray’s \u201cwish list\u201d, the only other conceivably \u201cwinnable\u201d issues might have been a very uphill fair use argument and a potentially more successful argument on the unconstitutionality of the statutory minimum damages provisions. I know you have tried to pursue both of these issues.
\nthese are the issues, not whether joel “did it”<\/em><\/p>\n\u2022 Fair Use. If there was a winnable argument here, which far greater experts than me have doubted according to your own blog, <\/p>\n
stop right there. starting from scratch the fair use issue now looms as a fundamental question in the allocation of function between judge and jury as providing a limitation in wisdom to the expansive power of copyright, so let them doubt, then consider, then be convinced<\/em><\/p>\nit would probably have involved a lot of analysis of the fourth factor (\u201cthe effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work\u201d) and this would presumably have required a lot of economic evidence. This evidence might have come, for starters, from your Harvard colleague Oberholzer-Gee and\/or Andersen\/Frenz in the UK as expert(s) to show that there was evidence as to no overall harm and maybe even a \u201cbenign\u201d or \u201cpositive\u201d effect on \u201cthe potential market for or value of the copyrighted work\u201d. At least such evidence might have enabled Judge Gertner to deny summary judgment on this issue. It would have also enabled a great debate with the very able Stan Liebowitz, with whom one may disagree – but he is still a very accomplished and important economist in the IP area and an experienced expert witness. <\/p>\n
as far as i can see leibowitz and oberholzer-gee essentially agree, stan putting his value judgment on “professionally” recorded music and felix on the growth in volume and quality of music from the people. but see how this very question mistakes the nature of the inquiry as a judgment for the jury to make case by case, this being joel’s case and joel’s right to trial by jury in which the fairness and justice of the actions being taken against him in the name of the state are open to address<\/em><\/p>\nMaybe other evidence in addition from someone with knowledge about the economic insides of the record industry would have helped. I frankly doubt, as you have suggested in the Canadian media in your interview with Jesse Brown, that the lack of \u201cfairness\u201d on the part of the record industry either in the way it has marketed music to its customers or treats is customers in its litigation campaign is a winnable fair use argument under \u00a7107, even if you are right that the four factors are not \u201cexclusive\u201d and that Court can go beyond the four factors and even devise a new \u201cfair use\u201d affirmative defense. Whether or not there is the makings of a potential \u201cabuse of process\u201d or Posnerian \u201cmisuse\u201d of copyright argument or something along these lines is hypothetically an interesting issue to speculate upon for another day, but doesn\u2019t seem to be on the record here and would also presumably require a lot of solid evidence.<\/p>\n
say more about Posnerian “misuse” of copyright. and note how the whole bogus strategy of imposing statutory damages on noncommercial direct infringers was put across on posner’s aimster dicta raised to holding by easterbrook in a case managed by jenner & bloch in which no challenge to the imposition of statutory damages was made<\/em><\/p>\n\u2022 Unconstitutional statutory minimum damages. This seems potentially much more winnable than fair use. But if there is a winnable argument here, it would probably also require lots of evidence to show that a statute that permits an award of up to $150,000 per work in these circumstances and $22,500 per work times 30 works as actually awarded for downloading and supposedly sharing 30 songs that sell for about $0.99 each retail goes so far beyond any possibly valid \u201cdeterrent\u201d or \u201cpunitive\u201d purpose that it is, on its face, unconstitutional. <\/p>\n
:<)<\/em><\/p>\nUnfortunately, the SCOTUS may not see this as self evident. Again, maybe Oberholzer-Gee or Andersen\/Frenz could have helped here, and perhaps other experts on the economics of the music industry, how file sharing actually works, how many of the ocean of unauthorized downloads can be causally attributed to Joel, and the overall question of proportionality. Maybe some expert sociological or criminological evidence on \u201cdeterrence\u201d. But given the post-Eldred approach to deference to Congress on quantifiable copyright policy matters such as extending the term from life + 50 to life + 70, I would imagine that you would now need a great deal of solid evidence to show that this choice of a numerical range of a minimum of $750 and up to $150,000 per work for willful infringement is not only beyond \u201carguably unwise\u201d but also somehow clearly unconstitutional. For better or worse, \u201cunwise\u201d and \u201cunfair\u201d may not equate with \u201cunconstitutional.\u201d <\/p>\n
there are two questions: first, when, if ever (and i say never) did congress decide that draconian damages against consumers was the appropriate response to peer-to-peer file sharing? second, reached only if the answer to the first requires it, would be whether the power to impose this damage at the unconstrained behest of the copyright industry by civil process (thereby bypassing the protections afforded criminal defenants) with no proof of actual damage caused by the defendant, purely for deterrence of conduct involving no trespass is unconstitutional.<\/em><\/p>\nBTW, there is an important article in the works by Pam Samuelson and Tara Wheatland, which I\u2019m sure you know about, but for the benefit of other readers can found here as a work in progress (recently revised).<\/em><\/p>\n
[more to come]<\/em><\/p>\nBest regards,<\/p>\n
Howard<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Dear Charlie: Here’s my response. http:\/\/excesscopyright.blogspot.com\/2009\/08\/my-response-to-prof-charles-nesson-re.html Best, Howard *** Dear Charlie: First of all, given the facts as they have come out both before and as reported in the various media during the trial (I obviously haven\u2019t seen the transcript), I still tend to doubt that this was a particularly winnable case. so stop right […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":370,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2765,439,387],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1135","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-american-jury","category-harvard","category-riaa","p1","y2009","m08","d25","h04"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/nesson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1135","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/nesson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/nesson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/nesson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/370"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/nesson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1135"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/nesson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1135\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1138,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/nesson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1135\/revisions\/1138"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/nesson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1135"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/nesson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1135"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/nesson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1135"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}