{"id":505,"date":"2009-02-03T16:43:55","date_gmt":"2009-02-03T21:43:55","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.law.harvard.edu\/mesh\/?p=505"},"modified":"2009-02-23T08:44:23","modified_gmt":"2009-02-23T13:44:23","slug":"iraqi-security-2009-checklist","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/2009\/02\/iraqi-security-2009-checklist\/","title":{"rendered":"Iraqi security: 2009 checklist"},"content":{"rendered":"

From Mark T. Kimmitt<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\" Following on Scott Carpenter’s excellent post<\/a> on the state of the Iraqi elections, it is also worthwhile to consider the security situation in Iraq. A year ago, I asked<\/a> if 2008 would be<\/p>\n

the year when the gains in security are met by gains in stability, or will the tremendous tactical gains achieved by our troops be withered away because of a lack of political consensus and the lack of political reconciliation? (Will those) gains in security translate into gains in stability? The next phase (of the Surge) will be far more difficult as it depends more on the Iraqis themselves to show progress on key legislation, show progress in their economy and to show progress in reconciliation.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

As 2008 demonstrated, there were tremendous gains in internal security, and the recent elections demonstrate that there is a flicker of hope for political consensus and reconciliation. The economy is in good shape and in many ways the envy of the region, despite the low price of oil. Regional governments, while not embracing Maliki, at least are no longer rejecting “that Iranian in Baghdad.” Overall, both the political and security situations are far better than one might have hoped in early 2007 when the “Surge” decision was announced. As a wag recently noted, the ultimate metric of success\u2014the fact that the war in Iraq rarely merits front page news\u2014has been achieved.<\/p>\n

However, the situation still remains tenuous and there is no reason for complacency or casual dismissal of the challenges. As I did in early 2008, let me offer a checklist of leading indicators for 2009.<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Keep an eye on potential flashpoints: Kirkuk, the pace of integration of the Sons of Iraq into Iraqi Security Forces, and post-election violence as results are announced.<\/li>\n
  2. Keep an eye on Iran, Syria, Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups. How will they see 2009? An opportunity to step into a perceived vacuum created by the departing U.S. forces? An opportunity to create mischief for the new U.S. administration? An opportunity to interfere in the wake of the recent Iraqi elections?<\/li>\n
  3. What will be the effect of a 16-month withdrawal policy for the U.S. combat brigades? As this will require the return of a brigade per month, will this lead to a security vacuum in those regions now covered?<\/li>\n
  4. Will the U.S. administration adhere to a 16-month schedule, or will there be some flexibility in this timeline?<\/li>\n
  5. Will the Iraqi government stick to the requirement for all U.S. forces to be out of the country by the end of 2011? Will there be provisions made for trainers, enablers, CT forces and the protection of U.S. facilities?<\/li>\n
  6. Are the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) ready to take over the responsibility in each of those brigade areas? While the ISF have proven willing and able to handle the direct fire engagements, they have been dependent to a great degree on U.S. intelligence, air support, logistics, fire support and communications. Is the ISF ready to fight a full-spectrum counterinsurgency on its own?<\/li>\n
  7. What will be the operational consequences of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)? Will insurgents and extremists attempt to leverage perceived restrictions on U.S. forces to increase their activities?<\/li>\n
  8. What will be the commercial consequences of the Status of Forces agreement on contractor organizations? Will contractors\u2014which now number well over 100,000 and handle much of the logistical and commercial activities\u2014depart en masse<\/em> given the transfer of legal jurisdiction from the parent country to the Iraqi judicial system and the departure of large numbers of U.S. forces?<\/li>\n
  9. Is the Iraqi Government ready to take responsibility for the large number of detainees that the SOFA hands over to them? Will the pressures of local politics demand the release of large numbers of detainees? How will the Iraqi government treat those detainees it retains? Will they cure or create the next generation of insurgents?<\/li>\n
  10. Will the downturn in oil prices have an effect on the budgets of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Intelligence? It was hoped that the Iraqi budget would include $12 billion for the ISF, and that these funds would pay for salaries, operations and procurement. Will the procurement budgets remain sufficient to buy the equipment necessary to pick up where the U.S. forces have left?\n

    Comments are limited to MESH members and invitees.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    From Mark T. Kimmitt Following on Scott Carpenter’s excellent post on the state of the Iraqi elections, it is also worthwhile to consider the security situation in Iraq. A year ago, I asked if 2008 would be the year when the gains in security are met by gains in stability, or will the tremendous tactical […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1620,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[401,2270,4481,1813],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-505","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-iraq","category-j-scott-carpenter","category-mark-t-kimmitt","category-military"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/505","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1620"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=505"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/505\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=505"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=505"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=505"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}