{"id":361,"date":"2008-08-12T13:29:48","date_gmt":"2008-08-12T17:29:48","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.law.harvard.edu\/mesh\/2008\/08\/debacle_in_the_caucasus\/"},"modified":"2008-08-24T12:39:13","modified_gmt":"2008-08-24T16:39:13","slug":"debacle_in_the_caucasus","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/2008\/08\/debacle_in_the_caucasus\/","title":{"rendered":"Debacle in the Caucasus"},"content":{"rendered":"

From Malik Mufti<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"Georgia’s attempt to gain control of South Ossetia by force on August 8 was ill-considered for several reasons. First, it led to a punishing Russian counter-attack that has crippled Georgia’s military capability. Second, it reduced to virtually nil Georgia’s chances of restoring its sovereignty over South Ossetia and the other breakaway region of Abkhazia for the foreseeable future\u2014both because of the enhanced Russian presence in both territories, and because Tbilisi’s resort to force confirmed the fears of the Ossetian and Abkhazian peoples about Georgian chauvinism. (During a similar offensive against Abkhazia in August 1992, Georgian officials threatened that the Abkhazian nation might be “left without descendants” and that “we can easily and completely destroy [their] genetic stock.”) Third, it dealt a grievous blow to Georgia’s chances of joining NATO\u2014again probably for the foreseeable future\u2014because neither the Europeans nor the Americans will want to risk involvement in armed conflict with Russia.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, because of the region’s critical energy reserves and pipeline networks, because of the fact that the Caucasus has reverted to its 19th-century status as a front line between the Islamic and Orthodox worlds\u2014a front line that will help define global politics in the coming century\u2014and because of the need to contain Russia’s increasingly aggressive neo-colonialist aspirations more generally, the United States cannot afford the temptation to disengage.<\/p>\n

Effective American engagement, however, will require more than maintaining a robust political and security presence in Georgia so that its sovereignty is not further compromised. The central challenge in the Caucasus\u2014on both sides of the Russian Federation’s borders\u2014is how to address the suppressed but deeply held and often conflicting nationalist aspirations of the multitudes of peoples living there. This will require reaffirming one traditional tenet of U.S. foreign policy, and reconsidering another. The principle that needs to be upheld is genuine political liberalization, so that minority groups feel less compelled to take up arms or turn to Russia for help. The principle that needs to be reconsidered is the commitment to the territorial integrity of existing states. Its mechanical application is simply unrealistic given prevailing conditions in the Near East, as already evidenced by the U.S. recognition of Kosovo’s independence, and by the proliferation of similar entities throughout the region.<\/p>\n

If Georgia can be induced to renounce aggressive chauvinism definitively in its dealings with other national groups, then the prospect of good-neighborly relations with the Ossetians, Abkhazians and others may materialize\u2014perhaps even within some kind of confederal or commonwealth framework. At the very least, it will present the peoples of the Caucasus with an attractive alternative to what Russia has to offer. Such a challenge to the repressive political and territorial status quo would put Moscow on the defensive, with profound implications far beyond the Caucasus.<\/p>\n

Comments are limited to MESH members and invitees.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

From Malik Mufti Georgia’s attempt to gain control of South Ossetia by force on August 8 was ill-considered for several reasons. First, it led to a punishing Russian counter-attack that has crippled Georgia’s military capability. Second, it reduced to virtually nil Georgia’s chances of restoring its sovereignty over South Ossetia and the other breakaway region […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1620,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2796,2408,2579],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-361","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-caucasus","category-michael-reynolds","category-russia"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/361","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1620"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=361"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/361\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=361"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=361"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=361"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}