{"id":1009,"date":"2009-07-03T09:15:18","date_gmt":"2009-07-03T13:15:18","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.law.harvard.edu\/mesh\/?p=1009"},"modified":"2009-08-09T13:41:51","modified_gmt":"2009-08-09T17:41:51","slug":"has-force-worked-for-israel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/mesh\/2009\/07\/has-force-worked-for-israel\/","title":{"rendered":"Has force worked for Israel?"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"iaae\"Israel America Academic Exchange (IAAE)<\/a> is a new organization that sponsors educational missions to Israel for American scholars in the fields of political science, international relations, international law, international economic development, modern history, and Middle East studies. By special arrangement, participants<\/a> in the inaugural mission (June 22-29) have been invited to guest-post their impressions and assessments. Bruce Jentleson is professor of public policy and political science at Duke University. He is also a member of MESH.<\/em><\/p>\n

From Bruce Jentleson<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

\"guns\"Central to our discussions was the debate over force and diplomacy as Israeli strategies, so I’ll focus on that for this post.<\/p>\n

Is it the case that the lessons of the last 10-15 years are that force has worked, both as compellence and deterrence, and diplomacy has not? This was the dominant argument we heard from Israeli speakers. While the speaker selection was short of representative, I know from other interactions and reading that this perspective has become more prevalent. It also is a view our American group debated among ourselves.<\/p>\n

Four main parts to the argument:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. The Gaza war was intended to impose substantial costs on Hamas and to deter further attacks on Israel. It achieved both; e.g., attacks from Gaza are down since the war.<\/li>\n
  2. The same regarding Hezbollah and the 2006 Lebanon war: Look at the northern front and how quiet Hezbollah has been, and how weakened the recent elections showed it to be in Lebanese politics.<\/li>\n
  3. Oslo didn’t work; Camp David 2000 was another instance of the Palestinians never missing an opportunity to miss an opportunity; unilateral withdrawals, both Barak in Lebanon and Sharon in Gaza, gave land but didn’t bring pace; plus the recent stories swirling about Olmert ostensibly offering even concessions on Jerusalem. Arafat was an essentialist; his successors may have more will but lack capacity; Hamas is ideological.<\/li>\n
  4. The status quo is not great for Israel, but it’s tolerable. Risk aversion, both security and politics, says keep relying on military power. Be sufficiently willing to negotiate to check off that box for the United States and the international community but not much more. Don’t antagonize the political coalition on which your power (read Netanyahu’s) depends.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    An alternative analysis:<\/p>\n