Jeffrey Goldberg’s thoughtful Op-Ed in today’s Times, as part of a collection of pieces relating to the 60th anniversary of Israel’s independence, resonates. Like my earlier post it highlights the differences among Jews, and it takes the important further step of explaining how and why those differences can lead to practical difficulties in policy-making.
On the specific question of what to do about the settlements, I had once considered the notion that Israel could simply choose to abandon them militarily: choose a new boundary of control, and pull back to that line. After establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Jews choosing to remain in settlements there could be subject to the laws in force there, and hold all the attendant rights and responsibilities. Relocation support could be offered, to facilitate settlers’ removal to Israel, ensuring that ideologues would predominate among the remaining settlers.
And those remaining would feel even more like they were manning sparse outposts in a threatened land. Moreover, especially lacking support from the Israeli military, direct conflicts with Palestinians would be likely. Some of the remaining settlers would make a tenuous peace; others would test the law-enforcement powers of the new Palestine; and some would be outmatched in outright battle.
I had once considered the “just pull out” option for four reasons. First, it’s obvious that creating a territorially viable Palestine requires either the elimination (and hence the relocation of the settlers to Israel) or absorption (as considered) of many existing settlements. Second, many settlers would not want to leave, for practical and ideological reasons (like the ones who were distraught about departing Gaza at the time of Israel’s pullout). Third, it is important for states, to mature, to have minorities whose rights must be protected.
Fourth is the scary one. I presume that the Palestinians, like any newly independent people, will feel more thrill about their independence if it comes with what they can call a victory. Armed clashes with recalcitrant settlers– which would be bloody and awful– would presumably result in Palestinian victories that would be satisfying for them.
My now clear opinion– against the military abandonment of settlements, and of settlers who choose not to accept the relocation support– mostly stems from greater fear about Reason #4. Israel would not be able to stick to a commitment to abandon settlers; settlers would not submit to the authority of a Palestinian state; and many of the 268,000 settlers would fight ferociously, and be heavily armed. In short, the resulting war between the settlers and the Palestinians over the West Bank would be a disaster.
… so I return to the familiar practical questions, which are implicit in pieces like Goldberg’s: how can consensus build to dismantle settlements, how can large settlements be incorporated into reasonable boundaries, how can two functioning, peaceful states emerge?
