{"id":3751,"date":"2005-04-12T00:58:07","date_gmt":"2005-04-12T04:58:07","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.law.harvard.edu\/formerlyknownas\/2005\/04\/12\/analogically-correct\/"},"modified":"2011-08-05T14:57:48","modified_gmt":"2011-08-05T18:57:48","slug":"analogically-correct","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/ethicalesq\/2005\/04\/12\/analogically-correct\/","title":{"rendered":"analogically correct"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/strong><\/em><\/font><\/font>\"approxS\"<\/font> H<\/strong><\/em>arvard Law Professor <\/font>Lloyd L. Weinreb<\/font><\/a> is known for his expertise in criminal, constitutional,<\/font><\/font> and intellectual-property law, as well as jurisprudence. His experience in the law — both broad<\/font> and deep — <\/font>has taught him the importance of the well-honed analogy. That makes him a hero for<\/font><\/font><\/font> Prof. Yabut and the rest of the f\/k\/a<\/em> gang (see, e.g.<\/em>, <\/font>our blurb<\/font><\/a> last month<\/font>, “differences we can’t see”). <\/font><\/font><\/p>\n

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\"WeinrebAnalogy\" <\/font> In the face of arguments from heavy-hitters like Richard Posner, Edward Levi and <\/font>Cass Sunstein against the use of analogical reasoning by judges and lawyers, Weinreb has written<\/font> Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument<\/em> <\/font><\/font><\/a>(Cambridge Press 2005). Weinreb explains <\/font>that the use of analogical reasoning is dictated by the nature of law, which requires the application<\/font> of rules to particular facts, and he helps the reader learn how to separate the analogical chaff from the <\/font>whole-grain variety (my lame comparison, not his).<\/font><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

<\/font> Although written for legal scholars, students, and practitioners, I hope it will become<\/font> must-read material for webloggers and weblog commentors — so as to ease the frequent agita I get<\/font> perusing those sources. Legal Reason<\/em> is filled with examples from both <\/font>the law and everyday life — <\/font><\/font>and it’s easy enough for editors from all generations and political persuasions to understand. I plan <\/font>to share examples and ideas from the book with my readers (and my long-suffering friends). And,<\/font> I already know what a number of my relatives will be getting for Christmas 2005.<\/font><\/p>\n

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like he’s biting
\nthe cold moon…
\ngargoyle<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n

my shadow looks \"approxS\"<\/font>
\nlike the Old Man’s!
\nfirst winter rain<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

cursing like sailors
\nat the plum tree…
\ncrows<\/p>\n

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…………………. by Kobaysahi Issa<\/a>, translated by David G. Lanoue<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n

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\"noYabutsSN\" Suffolk U. Law School prof <\/font>Andrew Perlman<\/font><\/a>, guest posting at the Legal Ethics Forum <\/em>today, compares roadblocks to Bar Admission for Out-of-State Lawyers s<\/font><\/font><\/font><\/span> <\/em><\/span>to protectionism,<\/span><\/font><\/font><\/font> and points to his recent article, which argues that the Admission rules are unconstitutional — violating<\/font><\/font><\/span> three constitutional provisions designed to prevent economic protectionism – the Article IV Privileges <\/font><\/font><\/span>and Immunities Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause, and the dormant <\/font><\/font><\/span>Commerce Clause. (<\/span>“A Bar Against Competition: The Unconstitutionality of Admission Rules for Out-<\/span><\/font><\/font><\/font> of-State Lawyers” . Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics<\/em>, Vol. 18, p. 135, 2004; click <\/font>here<\/font><\/a> for a <\/font><\/font><\/span>synopsis from SSRN, where the article can be dowloaded after a free registration. <\/font><\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

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