{"id":10,"date":"2004-08-24T23:54:15","date_gmt":"2004-08-25T04:54:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.law.harvard.edu\/dtrdev\/2004\/08\/24\/feeling-like-a-winner-even-when-youre-"},"modified":"2004-08-24T23:54:15","modified_gmt":"2004-08-25T04:54:15","slug":"feeling-like-a-winner-even-when-youre-a-loser","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/dtr\/2004\/08\/24\/feeling-like-a-winner-even-when-youre-a-loser\/","title":{"rendered":"Feeling Like a Winner Even When You’re a Loser"},"content":{"rendered":"

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A minor loss today, but very solid, much better play overall.  Very happy with that. I avoided the silly leaks from the small blind and with chasing overcards too much.  I probably won’t get to all the good stuff, because the interesting hands I want to talk about generally aren’t the ones I want to talk out.  Let’s break it down, getting the worst out of the way first:<\/P>
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Tight weak play of the day<\/STRONG>: I have KJ of hearts, call from EP, gets raised in MP by a solid (but not brilliant) player who I played with yesterday, about seven total callers, I call.  Flop comes with AQ of hearts along with a medium diamond.  MP raiser bets out, a couple folders, then I raise, two or three people fold, MP player calls, not sure whether I should read him as reluctant or merely questioning my play.  We’re now heads up.  Blank non-diamond comes off on turn, I check, he checks.  Blank comes off on river, completing neither flush nor straight, I check, he checks, he shows pocket 10s.<\/P>
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I don’t know what my strategy was on this, so let’s cut the bullshit: I played it wrong.  Let me rethink each stage of it.  First, on the flop, I appear to have 12 outs with my gutshot draw to the royal.  The raise doesn’t seem terrible because I figure a couple people had to get a piece of this, and my raise could both be a raise for value or a setup for a free card play depending on the situation.  12 outs twice is very strong.  A call might have been more appropriate, to setup a play on the turn.  I don’t think setting up a raise on the turn or raising on the flop would buy me any extra outs given the texture of the flop.  So not sure here.<\/P>
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Now, on the turn, I should have bet out.  At this point, there’s 9 big bets in the pot.  Though my draw remains incredibly strong, the bet isn’t clearly for value heads-up unless I am certain of the implied odds.  But that’s not the point.  The point is that it was heads-up and I forgot to consider all the strategic implications of that.  I am so used to everything being multiway on the turn, particularly when there are 7 people preflop calling a raise with a A and Q out, that I missed this key part.<\/P>
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The permutations: If I bet out on the turn, three things can happen.  (1) He can raise, at which point I can call, and, if I make my flush or straight, I can still feel fairly confident that I have the best hand unless it pairs the board; if I don’t make my hand, I lose 2 big bets.  (2) If I bet out and he calls, I can bet out again if I make my hand, or bet out again on the river in an attempt to steal the pot. After all, if he didn’t raise on the turn, that might mean he has only a Q, and a K might even be good for me, maybe.  (3) If I bet out and he folds, hurray for me.  In any case, worst case situation is that he calls me again on the river, and I lose two big bets.  <\/P>
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What if I check?  Well, he can check back, at which point I have a couple options on the river: check on the river if I miss (with absolutely ZERO positive expectation), bet out if I make my hand and perhaps get a call (my check on the turn suggests a draw of some kind), or bet out again as a bluff. The difference with a semi-bluff here is that it’s weaker because I didn’t bet the turn.  So it’s worst case of one lost bet in this permutation, but it has a lesser positive expectation as well.  If I check and he bets, I have to call, and my situation on the river remains much the same. If I make my hand, I may win a bet; if I miss it and bluff, it’s a weaker semi-bluff, or I can simply check and fold if I miss.  Again, probably worst case of one lost bet with lesser positive expectation.   Finally, I could check raise the turn, which sets me up for a possible reraise, particularly if he has a set which he would wait to raise with on the turn.  That would lead to potentially three lost bets, and, furthermore, the check raise probably has no better semi-bluff effect than betting out on the turn and river.  So let’s disregard this option.<\/P>
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Now add it all up.  If I bet out on the turn and plan to follow through with a call if there’s a raise or bluff on the river, I’m worst case going to lose 2 bets.  By stealing the pot or making my hand, I will win the 36 plus between 1-4 big bets (unless he folds the turn which I felt was unlikely).  If I don’t bet out, I will lose either 0 or 1 bets, and probably make only 1 bet.  It all looks fairly similar when you look at this way, though the extra bets if I bet the turn and the strength of the draw point to that option.  The real key, though, is that in the first case I have two strong ways to win the hand.  The draw alone probably made a bet fine, but the bluff plus the draw surely made it so.<\/P>
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The catch is that I felt I had a decent read on the guy that mitigated a bluff.  He did raise before the flop, he’s a solid player, and so I felt it was quite possible for him to have a set, aces and queens, or maybe AK.  He could have KQ, which would make me reverse dominated for my K.  I didn’t think he’d be scared enough to drop given the size of the pot.  I did not put him on merely 10s (which, of course, also reduced the chances of my draw).  And, what’s more, because I felt like he had a big pair, I forgot how strong my draw was and the position of the strength I held in this heads-up situation.  That’s a complete and utter misplay.<\/P>
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The good news, I guess, is that I didn’t make my draw and thus, in hindsight, I had to rely on the bluff alone.  Had that been the case, there probably would have been 44 in the pot, which means my bluff would have had to work 9% of the time.  Given he had 10s and the board was so scary, that might have been the case given that the player was decent.  So I still have plenty of reasons to kick myself for this hand.<\/P>
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Phew. Fairly large mistake, but luckily the only major one of the day.<\/P>
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Now, the tight-aggressive play of the day: <\/STRONG>This play is partly a result of reading Ed Miller’s two overpair hands chapter and his other parts about waiting for the turn.  I raise in late MP with 99s, get 4-5 callers for a moderate large pot pre-flop.  Flop comes 8 and with two other cards, raggedy and spades.  Guy leads out into me.  I just call.  One other player is already in and will simply call if I raise.  One player is already out.  I would like to push the other player out, but I have a sense that he is going out anyway, or will continue on regardless if they have a draw.  The better has either an 8 with a big kicker or a spade draw; what’s more, he will let me know on fourth street if has something bigger and I’m trapped.   My pot equity right now does not provide me with a substantial edge.  Fourth street brings a non-spade Jack.  I do not think this has hit him or the other player, and, again, think they will let me know if I am beat. I believe this is a safe card and that I am ahead.  If he bets and I just call, I will likely have to call a bet on the river unless a spade falls and I’m sure.  When he bets out, I raise, he just calls.  When no spade falls on the river, he checks to me, I bet, he folds.<\/P>
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It’s not perfect, it’s not the prettiest way of waiting for the turn to get a raise in, but it worked.  My read was right (I think he had an 8, in the end).  I won the pot.<\/P>
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Interesting overcards play:  <\/STRONG>I had QTs of clubs in middle position, I think there were about 7 callers preflop.  Flop comes pretty raggedy, 8, 7, and a 3, with one club.  I check, it gets bet by a really terrible player on the button, there are a few callers, I just call.  The turn is the 9 of clubs, given me an open ended straight draw and solid flush draw.  I bet, the person on my right raises.  I call, the river ends up being a 10, giving me top pair, but there’s plenty of meat on the board.  Because the pot has gotten so big at this point (there was a caller on the turn and I closed the river with two bets already ahead of me), I called with the top pair.  Probably this is another example of a too liberal call on the river, as I discussed yesterday.  There’s the straight, showing a 6 and 10 of hearts.<\/P>
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Also, would it have been worth raising on the flop? I only could have protected my hand against the two people on my left who were not already in yet. However, one of them did turn out to be the winner.  A raise would not have made it correct to call to the inside straight.  Then again, I just had overcards, and already had three bettors in front of me – is that really where I want to be putting in my raise, particularly when my overcards will make such a weak top pair?  Seems incorrect to raise here.<\/P>
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Also upset that I didn’t hit the straight flush again, when the guy on my right flopped one and the guy on my left flopped quads (grin).<\/P>
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The series of great hands and cracked hands<\/STRONG>: Rather than poor play and leaks compounding suck outs and leading to a huge loss, I had the suck outs or just unfortunate circumstances lead to my very minor loss.  I get KK in the small blind, there’s a raise in MP, I reraise, and the UTG caps.  Four players total.  Whew. I’m worried about AA and QQ, maybe AK or AQ.  One of the callers was a total loser, but the other two were decent enough players, particularly to be calling and then capping from UTG.  The flop comes with an Ace, I check, capper bets, called by all.  Turn comes with a Q, I check, capper bets, two calls.  I call time to repeat to myself again and again “YOU’RE BEAT!”  The pot was so enormous that I really needed to sit there and think a bit.  Could another K get me the win?  Probably not.  I fold.  The river was a Jack. All I remember is that the capper had AA in the hole, the first raiser had QQ in the hole, and they both got beat by the fourth guy, the loser player, who got a back door straight with T9s.  Just an unfortunate circumstance for me, but one that I lost the absolute minimum on all things considered.<\/P>
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Very next hand, I get AQs on the button.  Raise it up.  Don’t remember the exact circumstances, but several callers. Flop two pair, with two clubs and I’m not holding any.  I bet the flop, get raised, think someone’s on a draw, there are two callers.  Turn, I still bet, they just call.  River brings a club, along with a 3 that would make a straight for anyone holding 45.  This time there’s a bet in front of me by the loser player who won with T9s.  I think and think, look at what happened, and fold in part because there was a guy to act behind me.  Well, he didn’t have the flush, but the loser player was holding 45.  A good river laydown, in light of what I discussed yesterday and my read on the players.  Maybe a little risky, but correct in this instance<\/P>
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Another two hands later, I get KK again.  This time TWO aces flop.  I still bet out, hoping to make them respect my original raise given that I’d just raised twice before and hadn’t done much all day.  My sense from the other players is that this missed them.  At worst, it’s another two dollars worth investing in this pot with my Ks.  Bunch of folders, just one caller from a predictable player who I don’t think has it (same guy from the 99 hand above).  Turn is a blank, I bet again, he folds, I win a decent size pot (a several callers to my raise pre-flop).  Solid aggressive play on a scary flop – totally contrary to the tight weak play above.<\/P>
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Then, I get Aces UTG+1.  Because I had just shown the KK and had been raising so often recently, and because others had been willing to raise preflop, I try to just limp with the intention of raising and getting some more money in. Usually, I wouldn’t do this, but I felt, given the tenor of the table, it was right to mix it up here.  The loser is in the small blind, and I suppose he would have called anyway from there.  Long story short, I bet the flop, he calls, he bets out on the turn, mild concern with a call, and then bet and call on the river.  On the turn he made his inside straight draw holding 85. To add insult to injury, the board makes a straight to the seven on the river, so I really have to call again.<\/P>
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The semi-mistake I keep making<\/STRONG>:  What is it with me with K on a board with a Q also there but otherwise uncoordinated flop, and then check-raising from EP with top pair Kings and a weak kicker.  I ended up just losing to Queens over 5s, so I was ahead.  But with this raise I just end up checking the turn when I get callers.  What am I trying to accomplish here?  Was it worth knocking out just one player?  Sure, there became no straights or flushes possible, but what am I going for?  Why raise from EP here, even though top pair was often way better than what some of these jokers were playing?  Why not try to use the big bet of the turn to my advantage?  I need to finetune this to figure out how I should best use this to knock out players, given my positional disadvantage in the rest of the hand.<\/P><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A minor loss today, but very solid, much better play overall.  Very happy with that. I avoided the silly leaks from the small blind and with chasing overcards too much.  I probably won’t get to all the good stuff, because the interesting hands I want to talk about generally aren’t the ones I want to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1037,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1356],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-dtrstories"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/dtr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/dtr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/dtr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/dtr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1037"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/dtr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/dtr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/dtr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/dtr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/archive.blogs.harvard.edu\/dtr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}